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Educating for inquisitiveness: A case against exemplarism for intellectual character education

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ABSTRACT

One natural application of Linda Zagzebski’s Exemplarist Moral Theory (EMT) is found in the context of moral and intellectual character education. Zagzebski discusses this application in her recent book, commenting that ‘exemplars can serve as a guide for moral training’ (p. 129) and endorsing ‘the learning of virtue by imitation’ (p. 129). This theme has been pursued compellingly by authors working at the intersection of virtue ethics and education, contributing to an emerging case for exemplarist-based approaches to character education. I focus on intellectual character education and draw attention to an interesting case in which exemplarism in the classroom may be seen to inhibit, rather than promote, the development of intellectually virtuous character. This is the case of virtuous inquisitiveness.

KEYWORDS

inquisitiveness; intellectual character; character education; exemplarist moral theory (EMT); exemplarism; epistemology of education; virtue epistemology

One natural application of Linda Zagzebski’s Exemplarist Moral Theory (EMT) (2010, 2017) is found in the context of moral character education, as indicated by the present special issue. Zagzebski (2017) discusses this application in her recent book (2017, p. 5), commenting that ‘exemplars can serve as a guide for moral training’ (p. 129) and endorsing ‘the learning of virtue by imitation’ (p. 129). This theme has been pursued compellingly by authors working at the intersection of virtue ethics and education, contributing to an emerging case for exemplarist approaches to character education (Croce & Vaccarezza, 2017; Sundari and Christopher, 2015). I explore the applications of EMT to intellectual character education focusing on the intellectual virtue of inquisitiveness. I argue that the project of educating for virtuous inquisitiveness provides an interesting challenge to the wholesale adoption of exemplarist approaches to intellectual character education. Indeed, in the case of virtuous inquisitiveness exemplarism in the classroom may be seen to inhibit, rather than promote, the development of intellectually virtuous character. This is significant for exemplarist approaches to intellectual character education given the distinctive role that inquisitiveness plays in the cultivation of intellectually virtuous character. Moreover, it has implications for popular contemporary pedagogical strategies such as the ‘Socratic Teaching Method’ (STM). Theorists and practitioners exploring exemplarist approaches to intellectual character education should therefore pay attention to the special case of virtuous inquisitiveness.
I. The special case of virtuous inquisitiveness

The intellectual virtue of inquisitiveness is a primary intellectual virtue to educate for. I have defended the primacy of virtuous inquisitiveness in detail elsewhere (Watson, 2016) so will offer a summary here. Firstly, inquisitiveness serves as a motivating intellectual virtue: it plays a foundational role in the initiation of intellectually virtuous inquiry. More than any others of the intellectual virtues, virtuous inquisitiveness gets intellectually virtuous inquiry going. Secondly, inquisitiveness bears a distinctive relationship to the intellectual skill of good questioning. I have argued elsewhere that good questioning is a necessary component of virtuous inquisitiveness: the virtuously inquisitive person is characteristically motivated and able to engage sincerely in good questioning (Watson, 2015). Inquisitiveness can thus be characterized as the ‘question-asking virtue’. As such, virtuous inquisitiveness encompasses an intellectual skill that is central to the development of intellectually virtuous character. Good questioning not only acts as a stimulus to intellectually virtuous inquiry but also as a guide for ongoing inquiry and as a valuable tool in the cultivation of others of the intellectual virtues such as open-mindedness, intellectual humility and intellectual courage (Watson, 2018). Thus, inquisitiveness plays a distinctive role in both the initiation of intellectually virtuous inquiry and in the cultivation of intellectually virtuous character. It is a primary intellectual virtue to educate for. Given the natural applications of exemplarism to character education it is worth examining whether the exemplarist approach can be successfully applied in the case of educating for virtuous inquisitiveness.1

II. Exemplarism in education

In Chapter 5 of EMT, Zagzebski (2017) discusses the practical applications of exemplarism for moral development and moral education. As with the purely theoretical discussion, she maintains that the practical applications of exemplarism derive from the central role of the moral emotions, and in particular, admiration. Beyond this, however, there is little concrete guidance for the would-be practitioner of exemplarist moral or intellectual character education. Zagzebski does not propose specific teaching methods or techniques, nor does she outline an overall pedagogical strategy. For the most part, it remains an enticing matter for education theorists and practitioners to determine which methods or strategies are best suited to inducing admiration for one exemplar or another and, moreover, if doing so has a positive impact on moral development.

One directive on this score comes from Zagzebski’s endorsement of a broadly Aristotelian approach to character development that emphasizes ‘the learning of virtue by imitation’ (p. 129). Here we are given an insight into a pedagogical strategy that arguably lies at the heart of exemplarist education. Key to the development of virtuous character is the imitation (and eventual emulation) of the exemplar’s virtuous actions. Zagzebski speaks of an innate ‘imitation mechanism’ and writes, ‘There is a multitude of evidence of the way we acquire both behavior patterns and desires and emotions from other people’ (p. 130). ‘Emulation,’ she continues, ‘is a form of imitation in which the emulated person is perceived as a model in some respect’ (p. 131). Imitation is a central feature of the exemplarist approach to character education: virtue is learned through the imitation of exemplars. Let us call this the ‘learning by imitation’ model for
character education. How does this exemplarist approach fare in the case of inquisitiveness?

III. Learning inquisitiveness by imitation

In order to imitate something, one must first observe it. The learning by imitation model therefore requires that virtuous behaviour be demonstrated and observed in the classroom. Taken at face value, this model can reasonably be interpreted as recommending that teachers exhibit virtuous behaviour in the classroom. In this way students are provided with an immediate and concrete opportunity to observe the virtues and so to imitate them. As noted, inquisitiveness is the question-asking virtue. This means that teachers seeking to exhibit virtuous inquisitiveness in the classroom should aim to exhibit good questioning. This is one pedagogical strategy that appears to follow from the learning by imitation model for the purpose of cultivating virtuous inquisitiveness.

It would also appear to stand the exemplarist approach in good stead. At least it is uncontroversial to suggest that good teachers ask good questions. Indeed, here the exemplarist approach finds significant common ground with educational theory and practice of the past decades. Gall (1970), in her comprehensive review of the literature in 1970 maintained that, ‘It is a truism for educators that questions play an important role in teaching’ (p. 707). What then does research in education and educational psychology tell us about the prospects for an exemplarist approach to educating for inquisitiveness based on the learning by imitation model. I will argue that, despite a prevalence of teacher questioning, the evidence suggests that students do not imitate teacher questioning in the classroom. Consequently, we have reason to doubt the effectiveness of the learning by imitation model in the case of virtuous inquisitiveness.

a. Teacher questioning

Research on teacher questioning has received significant attention in education theory spanning several decades (Dantino & Paradise, 1988; Dillon, 1981, 1982; Gall, 1970, 1984; Grow-Maienza, Hahn, & Joo, 2001). Much of the literature focuses on measuring teacher questioning and its impact on student achievement, including the numbers, types and cognitive level of questions asked by teachers (Kleinman, 1965; Martin & Pressley, 1991; Miller & Pressley, 1989; Riley, 1981; Wright & Nuthall, 1970). In addition, contributors aim to provide practical guidance for teachers on how to incorporate questions into their teaching (Brualdi 1998; Aschner, 1961; Farrar, 1983; Guthrie, 1983; Hollingsworth, 1982; Hunkins, 1972; Sachen, 1999). From this we can discern a foundational assumption, namely, that teacher questioning is a common pedagogical practice. This is reflected in Barbara Gayle, Raymond Preiss and Mike Allen’s (2006) survey of the literature in which they note, ‘Most of the advice or pedagogical exploration articles written are based on the observation that teachers frequently ask questions in their classrooms’ (p. 281).

There is broad consensus on this score. In her 1970 review, Gall cites the following results from three independent studies:
10 primary-grade teachers asked an average of 348 questions each during a school day (Floyd, 1960); 12 elementary-school teachers asked an average of 180 questions each in a science lesson (Moyer, 1965); and 14 fifth-grade teachers asked an average of 64 questions each in a 30-minute social studies lesson (Schreiber, 1967). Furthermore, students are exposed to many questions in their textbooks and on examinations. (Gall, 1970, p. 707)

Twelve years later, Dillon (1982), summarizing further empirical studies, writes 'It is a well-documented fact that teachers traditionally ask a lot of questions' (p. 127). Twenty-four years after this, Gayle et al. (2006) echo these results in their review of empirical studies, referring to 'the pervasive use of educational questions' (p. 279). They write:

Anecdotal and empirical evidence indicates that oral questioning is a fundamental aspect of daily classroom interactions. Written questions are common in handouts, assignments, projections, Web content, and study guides. (2006, p. 279)

The results of these empirical studies on teacher questioning are conclusive. The foundational assumption—that teacher questioning is a common pedagogical practice—is both uncontroversial and unsurprising. But what are the effects of this pedagogical practice on student behaviour in the classroom. Do students imitate teacher questioning in the way suggested and required by the exemplarist learning by imitation model.

b. Student questioning

Extensive work by the educational theorist James Dillon throughout the 1980s focused on the analysis of student questioning in classrooms (1978, 1981, 1982, 1988). Dillon describes his own work as well as reviewing other studies, beginning as early as 1938 (Corey, 1940; Fahey, 1942; Houston, 1938; Johns, 1968; Susskind, 1969, 1979; Tizard, Hughes, Carmichael, & Pinkerton, 1983; Yamamoto, 1962). The results of these studies are as conclusive as those of the studies that focus on teacher questioning. They find that students ask very few questions in the classroom. Stephen Corey (1940) reports 114 student questions over the course of a week’s observation of six senior high classes containing 169 students—less than one question per student. Johns (1968) found that student questions accounted for just 2% of the questions asked during observations of six secondary school discussion classes. Dillon’s (1988) study, involving recordings of 27 discussion classes in six schools, reports an average of two questions per hour from all the students in each class, compared with 84 questions per hour from the teacher. Susskind (1969) found approximately the same average in a study of primary school classes and reports even starker results in a study, 10 years later, involving 32 social studies classes. Summarizing these findings, Susskind states:

To put it baldly, our data indicate that children do not ask questions in school. Given an average rate of SQ [student questions] equaling 1.8 per half hour for the entire class, one would project that, on the average, an individual student asks a total of 8.3 SQ per year, that is 1 SQ per month in all his social studies classes combined. (Susskind 1979, p. 103)

Dillon summarizes the findings of the studies with similar candor: ‘No one has ever gone into a sample of classrooms and found a lot of student questions...investigators can scarcely find any student questions’ (p. 199). A later study by Pearson and West
(1991) involving observations of college age students in 15 college communication classes found that students in these classes asked a somewhat higher average of 3.3 questions per hour. The authors nonetheless echo their predecessors’ sentiments; ‘the research that is available suggests that students ask far fewer questions than might be expected by educators’ (p. 22). The empirical research overwhelmingly indicates that students ask relatively few questions in the classroom.

Significantly, over and above a lack of student questions, the empirical findings indicate a negative correlation between teacher questioning and student questioning. A higher rate of teacher questions correlates with a lower rate of student questions. Reflecting on the results of his classroom studies, Susskind (1979) comments, ‘Clearly, the teacher is the primary initiator, while the student adopts a responsive role: the teacher questions, the student replies’ (p. 103). Tizard et al. (1983) likewise comment, ‘children seem to learn very quickly that their role at school is to answer, not to ask questions’ (p. 279). Dillon picks this up noting:

Observers from various perspectives have described classroom discourse as a series of three-part exchanges, principally a teacher question, a pupil response, and a teacher comment—plus a further question. (1982, p. 128)

Dillon (1982) cites socio-linguistic research that refers to this dynamic as “an exponential law of successive questioning”, whereby the chances at any point are two to one that a teacher will ask a question” (p. 128). A study by the psychologist Mishler (1975), based on recordings of four primary classrooms across the course of a school year found that in 85% of the exchanges between teachers and students, teachers were heard to ask a further question after a student had responded to an initial question and in 67% of exchanges teachers were heard to respond to student questions by asking another question. Simply put, teachers ask questions and students answer them.

Such low rates of student questioning may at first seem surprising. However, on reflection, it is not all that surprising to find that teacher questioning leads to student answering. This is so simply in virtue of the natural question-answer dynamic. When a teacher poses a question her students are placed in the position of answerers, not questioners. They are asked to provide answers, not questions and encouraged to refine their answering, as opposed to questioning, skills. The more questions a teacher asks, the more often she places her students in the position of answerers as opposed to questioners, reducing the opportunities for student questioning to arise. We have seen that teachers ask a lot of questions in classrooms. Given question-answer dynamics, it is natural to find that students ask very few questions as a result. In short, teacher questioning inhibits, rather than promotes student questioning in the classroom.

This conclusion exposes a tension between the exemplarist learning by imitation model and the successful cultivation of virtuous inquisitiveness in the classroom. According to the learning by imitation model, teachers should demonstrate virtuous inquisitiveness in order for students to observe and imitate it. This requires teachers to exhibit good questioning. But, when a teacher exhibits questioning (of any kind) in the classroom she places her students in the position of answerers. Rather than learning to imitate the teacher’s questions, students become ever more adept at answering them. In order to learn and practice virtuous inquisitiveness, however, students must be allowed to take up positions as questioners in their educational environments, enabling them to
develop and refine their questioning skills. The evidence suggests that they do not do this when teachers are asking the questions: students do not imitate teacher questions, they answer them. Consequently, while virtuous inquisitiveness is no doubt a trait that many would want to find in teachers, by exhibiting this trait in the classroom teachers risk inhibiting the progress of their students towards developing it themselves. In the case of virtuous inquisitiveness, we have reason to doubt the effectiveness of the exemplarist learning by imitation model.

IV. An objection

I have taken the learning by imitation model to be a central component of the exemplarist approach based largely on Zagzebski’s (2017) comment in Chapter 5 of EMT, when introducing the theory’s practical applications, that her ‘focus is on the learning of virtue by imitation’ (p. 129). She goes on to cite a number of studies illustrating the significance of imitation in prompting virtuous actions. Zagzebski’s use of these studies to demonstrate the relationship between imitation and virtuous action supports the idea that imitation is meant to be playing a central role when it comes to applying exemplarism to moral education. As noted, Zagzebski does not offer explicit pedagogical strategies and as such it remains a question for educational theorists and practitioners to apply and test the theory. It seems plausible that the learning by imitation model is at least one key to converting exemplarism into pedagogical practice for the purposes of character education.

However, one might worry that my interpretation of this model has been too crude. It does not, for example, necessarily follow from the learning by imitation model that teachers themselves can or should be expected to exhibit the exemplary behaviours they hope to cultivate in the classroom. Rather, one might argue, exemplarism requires a less direct approach, one in which teachers present and stimulate discussion of exemplary figures, either from history, in contemporary life, or through fictional narratives, rather than exhibiting exemplary behaviour themselves. Zagzebski places an emphasis on the role of narratives for instructional purposes throughout EMT so this interpretation of how exemplarism would play out in an education context seems warranted. There is not space to discuss the possible benefits of this more indirect form of exemplarism for character education here. In response to the present worry, however, it is worth considering the implications of denying the centrality of the more direct version in the form of the learning by imitation model.

One of the most compelling features of exemplarism is the suggestion that we should take seriously the role that exemplary individuals’ actions, behaviour and character play in the development and cultivation of the virtues. This has practical applications for character education, as indicated not least of all by the present volume. If we discount the role of teachers as everyday exemplars in the classroom, however, the practical applications of exemplarism for character education would be significantly more limited. Teachers will no doubt find numerous creative and inspiring ways to introduce students to exemplars and may, in doing so, succeed in promoting admiration of the various moral and intellectual virtues exhibited by these exemplary individuals. But do we not also want teachers themselves to demonstrate virtuous character in their classrooms so that students are exposed to concrete, immediate and everyday instances of
the virtues, promoting and inspiring admiration along the way. Many of us reflecting on our own education no doubt remember those few special teachers who ultimately inspired just this kind of admiration in us. Brogan and Brogan (1995) highlight this point, quoting also, in part, Theodore Sizer (1992):

This is why, when we ask our student teachers to describe their own favorite teachers, they invariably speak in glowing terms about how they admired this “person” and the love of learning embodied in this person, and how much their lives were “influenced” by this intellectually based relationship. (Brogan & Brogan, 1995, p. 291)

It would be a strange result if adopting an exemplarist approach to character education meant dismissing or discouraging the role of teachers as models for the cultivation of students’ moral or intellectual character. This provides further reason for taking the learning by imitation model to be a central aspect of converting exemplarism into pedagogical practice. If this interpretation is accurate, however, as I have argued, we have reason to doubt the effectiveness of exemplarism for the purposes of cultivating virtuous inquisitiveness in the classroom.

V. Pedagogical implications

What are the pedagogical implications of this conclusion. The empirical evidence I have cited, while both extensive and conclusive, is nonetheless outdated. Interest among education researchers in questions and questioning experienced a surge in the 1970s and 1980s. This interest subsided during the 1990s and has not yet regained momentum. As such, much of the research I have drawn on is 40- to 50-years-old including most of the empirical studies. Given how much the landscape of education can and does change over the course of several decades, one can reasonably ask whether claims about the relative frequency of teacher and student questions in the classroom still hold true. This is a legitimate concern. Note, that it does not affect the conclusion of the argument itself but rather raises a question about what pedagogical implications follow from that conclusion in a contemporary setting. In its own right, the conclusion that the learning by imitation model is not effective in the case of virtuous inquisitiveness, does not rely on whether or not the empirical results of the 1970s and 1980s hold true in the classrooms of today. The data provides support for the conclusion, in principle, irrespective of when it was collected. Nonetheless, if we want to cultivate virtuous inquisitiveness in the classroom this conclusion has a practical upshot. Teacher questioning will inhibit the development of virtuous inquisitiveness in students. Thus, we should seek to discourage teacher questioning in the classroom. However, if it turns out, contrary to the empirical evidence of the 1970s and 1980s, that students are the primary question-askers in contemporary classrooms, this practical intervention will be redundant. While the conclusion itself remains unchanged, there would be little reason for education theorists or practitioners to act upon it and the pedagogical implications would be trivial.

There is, however, evidence to suggest that the relative frequencies of teacher and student questions have not changed so dramatically over the past 50 years so as to have been significantly altered or, indeed, reversed. Perhaps most tellingly we can look to the continuing production of instructional resources for teachers on how to use questions
in the classroom. These are certainly no less abundant (and almost certainly more so) than they were in the 1970s and 1980s. Take, for example, Dantanio and Beisenherz (2001) Learning to Question, Questioning to Learn: Developing Effective Teacher Questioning Practices, Esther Fusco’s (2012) Effective Questioning Strategies in the Classroom, Gordon Pope’s (2013) Questioning Technique Pocketbook, Mike Gershon’s (2013) How to use Questioning in the Classroom: The Complete Guide and Peter Worley’s 100 Ideas for Primary Teachers: Questioning (2019). This incomplete list indicates that teacher questioning is still a common, and widely endorsed pedagogical practice. Against this background, the pedagogical implications of the conclusion we have arrived at are more significant. The upshot that we should discourage, rather than promote, teacher questioning in the classroom looks to be going against the grain.

To explore the pedagogical implications of our conclusion in more depth, it will be instructive to examine a specific teaching strategy popular among contemporary education theorists and practitioners. This strategy is variously labelled “Socratic Teaching”, “Socratic Questioning”, “The Socratic Method” and so on. I will refer to it as the “Socratic Teaching Method” (STM). In essence, the STM is a teaching strategy aimed at stimulating and facilitating classroom discussion. Over and above this, advocates of the STM assert a number of benefits including “sharpen[ing] participants’ critical thinking skills’ (Piro and Anderson, 2015, p. 279), developing “convergent and divergent thinking” (Brogan & Brogan, 1995, p. 296) and “inculcating the spirit of inquiry and the love of learning in . . . students” (Brogan & Brogan, 1995, p. 289). This latter is the benefit perhaps most consistently cited by advocates and practitioners of the STM in its various forms. Richard Paul and Linda Elder, founders of the US-based Foundation For Critical Thinking, write of the STM: “In Socratic teaching we focus on giving students questions, not answers. We model an inquiring, probing mind by continually probing into the subject with questions.” [http://www.criticalthinking.org/pages/socratic-teaching/606. Accessed: 21 July 2018]. Dillon (1980) captures this goal of the STM succinctly: “One of the purposes for this questioning is presumably to stimulate curiosity and inquiry in the student” (p. 17). Brogan and Brogan (1995) make the point even more overtly when they conclude their discussion of the benefits of the STM:

We must make training in effective questioning an important part of teacher education and professional development. We cannot give first order thinking to students, but we can give them the gift of the question and the spirit of inquiry—prerequisites for thinking. (Brogan & Brogan, 1995, p. 296)

This consensus regarding the effects of the STM suggests that the STM can be viewed as a version of the exemplarist learning by imitation model. Practitioners of the STM aim to promote an inquiring mind in their students by modelling it themselves.

In a recent paper, Croce and Vaccarezza (2017) argue for a “pluralist exemplar-based approach to moral education”. According to this approach, exemplarist moral education may focus either on the cultivation of moral character as a whole, through exposure to moral saints, or on the cultivation of individual virtues, through exposure to moral heroes (persons who demonstrate just one virtue to an exceptional degree). The project of educating for virtuous inquisitiveness is at least prima facie an individual virtue cultivation project. Assuming that Croce and Vaccarezza’s argument extends to the domain of intellectual character, an exemplarist approach to educating for virtuous
inquisitiveness might therefore be expected to do so via exposure to intellectual heroes who demonstrate virtuous inquisitiveness to an exceptional degree. The STM could be considered just this type of approach. Socrates is viewed as an exemplar of inquisitiveness, a kind of hero for philosophical inquiry. The STM takes Socrates as a central inspiration for pedagogical practice and holds him up as the exemplar for a particular model of inquiry. As such, the STM can be viewed as an (unintentional) version of the exemplarist learning by imitation model; one that is in practice in contemporary education.

So what does our conclusion recommend for practitioners of the STM. Simply put, insofar as teachers aim to cultivate inquisitiveness through the STM, they should refrain from posing questions. Rather students should be encouraged to develop and frame their own questions, placing the teacher in the position of answerer. This is one way to ensure that students are given the opportunities they need to practice and refine their questioning, rather than answering skills. Happily, the STM is just the kind of pedagogical practice that can incorporate this recommendation given its explicitly dialogical nature. Indeed, many teachers who use the STM aim to adopt it in precisely this way. The conclusion I have defended here, however, highlights the significance of using the STM as a platform for student, rather than teacher questioning, and so as a means of reducing instances of teacher questions in the classroom. This runs contrary to the extensive pedagogical literature that focuses on uses of teacher questioning. As long as the STM represents an (unintentional) form of exemplarism in which teachers seek to model good questioning, it will not be an effective means of cultivating virtuous inquisitiveness in students. Indeed, this recommendation extends to pedagogical practice more broadly, beyond the STM. If teachers want to encourage good questioning in their students, they should ask less questions themselves.

One could argue that this recommendation is too strong. The conclusion above is based on evidence of a negative correlation between teacher and student questioning. However, all that has been demonstrated is that teacher questioning inhibits student questioning in the classroom by placing students in the position of answerers. It remains possible that students nonetheless learn to model teachers’ good questions outside of this context and so do, in fact, come to develop virtuous inquisitiveness via the learning by imitation model. This objection brings to the fore an underlying pedagogical foundation for the recommendation; one that, much like exemplarism itself, draws on a broadly Aristotelian approach. I am assuming that the intellectual virtues are, at least to some extent, developed by practicing and refining the relevant intellectual skills. Much like learning to play the piano, for example, requires practice, so too does learning to be virtuously inquisitive. Perhaps a student could learn to play the piano by merely observing her teacher playing it but it is uncontroversial to suggest that a more effective strategy is for the teacher to guide the student as she attempts to play it herself. So too in the case of inquisitiveness, where the relevant intellectual skill is good questioning. Students who are not given opportunities in the classroom to practice and refine the skill of good questioning, but instead merely observe good teacher questioning, are correspondingly not given (as many) opportunities to practice being virtuously inquisitive. Assuming that practice does have a substantive role to play in virtue development, then these students will also be less likely to develop virtuous inquisitiveness in the classroom. The recommendation, therefore, amounts to a call for
pedagogical practices that explicitly provide these opportunities for practice and refinement by reducing teacher questioning and deliberately and consistently placing students in the position of questioners in their classroom interactions.

Importantly, this is not to say that good teacher questioning has no positive effects on student learning. At most the education research suggests that more (or perhaps different) contemporary empirical work is needed in order to establish a firm case either for or against the use of teacher questioning as a pedagogical strategy. Rather, my aim here has been to determine whether good teacher questioning leads to good student questioning. The conclusion I have defended is that it does not. This is significant for the exemplarist approach to educating for virtuous inquisitiveness based on the learning by imitation model. If students do not learn to be good questioners by imitating teacher questioning, then they cannot learn to be virtuously inquisitive through this mechanism either. This leaves open the possibility that they can learn to be virtuously inquisitive by some other, less direct mechanism. Perhaps students learn something about the value of an inquisitive frame-of-mind from their question-asking teachers. But the learning by imitation model, which Zagzebski (2017) describes as her focus for applying exemplarism to moral education, will not in and of itself succeed in educating for virtuous inquisitiveness. I have argued that it may in fact inhibit students from developing the virtue and have explored the pedagogical implications of this.

VI. Conclusion

I take the tension I have identified to be idiosyncratic to the case of educating for virtuous inquisitiveness. The tension arises from a distinctive feature of the virtue, namely, the defining role of good questioning and from the distinctive and unavoidable question–answer dynamic. It is in virtue of this dynamic that the effectiveness of the exemplarist approach to educating for the virtue is brought into question. The same cannot be said about the task of educating for any of the other individual intellectual virtues given that they are not (at least not obviously) defined by good questioning. Likewise, for the moral virtues which are even less obviously defined (or related to) good questioning, and at the same time, are arguably the more explicit target of current or future attempts to apply exemplarism to character education. As such, the conclusion of this article cannot and does not intend to speak to the project of applying exemplarist approaches to character education, in the broadest sense. There is no doubt plenty of worthwhile theoretical and practical work for education researchers to do in order to test and substantiate the idea that exemplarism can and should be used as a tool for the cultivation of virtuous character in schools.

That being said, the article does have a general point to make about the wholesale adoption of an exemplarist approach to intellectual character education. That is insofar as the task of educating for intellectually virtuous character relies centrally on the success of educating for virtuous inquisitiveness. I have argued here that inquisitiveness is a primary intellectual virtue to educate for. As such, over and above exposing the specific issues that arise from applying exemplarism to the cultivation of virtuous inquisitiveness, my aim has been to highlight the significance of this idiosyncratic case for exemplarist approaches to intellectual character education. The case of inquisitiveness, while idiosyncratic, is nonetheless significant in virtue of the distinctive role
that inquisitiveness plays in the initiation of intellectually virtuous inquiry and in the
cultivation of intellectually virtuous character, including others of the individual intel-
lectual virtues such as attentiveness and intellectual humility. As such, theorists con-
cerned with developing an exemplarist approach to intellectual character education in
practice should pay close attention to the interesting and divergent case of virtuous
inquisitiveness.

Notes

1. This characterisation of inquisitiveness identifies both a motivational and a skill compo-
nent of the virtue, in line with Zagzebski (1996). For reasons of space, I will focus on
development of the skill component in what follows, namely the skill of good questioning.
I take both the motivational and skill components to be necessary for exhibiting virtuous
inquisitiveness so if it is the case, as I will argue, that the exemplarist approach inhibits
good questioning in the classroom, then this is sufficient to show that the exemplarist
approach inhibits the development of virtuous inquisitiveness. Nonetheless, there is sub-
stantially more that could be said in an examination of the effects of exemplarism for the
motivational component, which may be quite different.

2. Thanks to an anonymous referee for highlighting this.

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research focuses on the nature and value of questioning in education, politics and everyday life.

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